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FOREWORD: IS IT TIME FOR AN ABBREVIATED
PREMARKET APPROVAL FOR MEDICAL DEVICES?
Brian P. Wallenfelt†
This Symposium Issue of the William Mitchell Law Review
focuses on recent developments in medical-device law. The world
1
of medical devices is expansive. It includes everyday items, such as
2
3
toothbrushes and sunglasses, as well as more exotic items, such as
4
snakebite kits. Its reach spans from items permanently implanted
5
in patients, such as pacemakers, to those that are only briefly in
6
contact with patients, such as scalpels. It also covers those objects
that are never physically in contact with patients, such as surgical
7
lamps.
Many elements of medical-device law are rapidly changing, a
transformation which the articles that follow explore. This
†
JD Candidate, William Mitchell College of Law, May 2013; Executive
Editor, William Mitchell Law Review, Volume 39, Issue 4. I thank all of the
authors of articles in this Symposium Issue and the members of the William
Mitchell Law Review. I also thank Professors David Prince, Lars Noah, and Greg
Duhl for their ideas and help with this symposium and foreword. Finally, I thank
my wonderful wife and children for everything.
1. A medical device is defined as “an instrument, apparatus, implement,
machine, contrivance, implant, in vitro reagent, or other similar or related
article,” which is “intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions,
or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, in man or other
animals” or “intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of man or
other animals” and, to exclude drugs and foods, “does not achieve its primary
intended purposes through chemical action within or on the body of man or other
animals and which is not dependent upon being metabolized for the achievement
of its primary intended purposes.” 21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (2006).
2. 21 C.F.R § 872.6855 (2012) (“Manual toothbrush”); Id. § 872.6865
(“Powered toothbrush”).
3. Id. § 886.5850.
4. Id. § 872.5740.
5. Id. § 870.3610; see also, e.g., id. § 872.3630 (“Endosseous dental implant”);
id. § 872.4760 (“Bone plate”).
6. Id. § 878.4800 (“Manual surgical instrument for general use”); see also,
e.g., id. § 878.6265 (“Examination gloves”); id. § 880.2700 (“Stand-on patient
scale”).
7. Id. § 878.4580; see also, e.g., id. § 892.1750 (“Computed tomography X-ray
system”); id. § 862.2860 (“Mass spectrometer for clinical use”).
1026
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foreword will briefly describe the history and framework of medicaldevice law that underlie the discussions in many of these articles. It
also will briefly point out an area of medical-device law that is stuck
in the 1970s and suggest a potential solution.
Medical-device law came into its own with the enactment of
8
the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (MDA), which, among
other things, added a regulatory approval process for devices to the
9
Before that, the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act (FDCA).
regulation was uneven, with medical devices sometimes subjected
10
to the federal approval process for drugs. For example, prior to
the MDA, the United States Supreme Court held that a laboratory
diagnostic—one that never touched nor was even in the same room
as the patient—was a drug and therefore was subject to the drug
11
approval process. This exemplified the non-standard definition of
“drug” in the FDCA. In addition to potentially being subjected to
the federal drug approval process, medical devices were also
subject to varied and potentially conflicting state-approval
12
processes.
Congress attempted to clean up this morass by enacting the
MDA. First, the MDA says that no state “may establish or continue
in effect with respect to a device intended for human use any
requirement” that is “different from, or in addition to, any
requirement” of the MDA and “which relates to the safety or
13
effectiveness of the device.”
This broadly preempted state
requirements and regulatory processes applicable to medical
devices.
Second, the MDA created a premarket approval (PMA)

8. Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 21 U.S.C.).
9. Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended at 21
U.S.C. §§ 331–397 (2006)).
10. The definition of drug was (and still is) incredibly broad. Subject to
some exceptions, drugs are defined as “articles intended for use in the diagnosis,
cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man or other animals;
and . . . articles (other than food) intended to affect the structure or any function
of the body of man or other animals.” 21 U.S.C. § 360(g)(1)(b)–(c) (2006).
11. See United States v. An Article of Drug . . . Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S. 784
(1969).
12. See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 315–16 (2008) (noting that
several states adopted approval processes in the seventies); see also id. at 342
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing “potentially conflicting state regulatory
regimes”).
13. 21 U.S.C. §360k(a).
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process for medical devices.
The PMA process is quite timeconsuming and expensive to complete, requiring, among other
things, information on the following: clinical investigations,
15
principles of operation, and manufacturing facilities and controls.
The PMA process, however, is not applicable to all medical devices.
Instead, devices are classified based on the level of controls
16
required to ensure safety and effectiveness.
And only those
devices requiring the highest level of controls—Class III devices—
17
are subject to the PMA process.
There is one additional group of devices that are exempt from
the PMA process: Class III devices that were already on the market
18
at the time the MDA was enacted.
The FDA may, however,
override this default by regulation and require a PMA for even a
19
pre-1976 device. In addition, to prevent pre-1976 devices from
having a monopoly, a new device that is substantially equivalent to a
20
pre-1976 device is not subject to the PMA process.
Those
substantially equivalent devices are typically subject to the lessrigorous premarket notification process, which is also known as the
21
510(k) process.
Under the 510(k) process, a manufacturer
notifies the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) that it
intends to introduce a new device, asserts that it is substantially
equivalent to a pre-1976 device, and waits for an order from the
22
FDA clearing the device.
This dual-approval path creates an odd dichotomy triggered
off of a date that is nearly forty years old. Most devices enter the
market through the 510(k) process, which operates like the
children’s game of telephone, in which a secret message is
whispered from one child to the next. The manufacturers of new
devices assert substantial equivalence to a recently introduced
device, the manufacturers of which had previously asserted
substantial equivalence to a slightly older device, and so on until
the chain reaches a device introduced prior to 1976. And much

14. Id. § 360e.
15. See id. § 360e(c)(1)(A)–(C).
16. See id. § 360c(a)–(d).
17. Id. § 360e(a).
18. Id. § 360c(f)(1)(A)(i)(I). The FDA may, however, require a PMA for a
pre-1976 device.
19. See id. § 360e(b).
20. Id. § 360c(f).
21. Id. § 360(k). Section 360(k) corresponds to section 510(k) of the FDCA.
22. Id.; id. § 360(n).
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like the message that the child at the end of the line hears, the new
device may barely resemble the original one. Nonetheless, the
510(k) process works.
It fosters competition by allowing
competitors to enter the market quickly. It also fosters innovation
and lower prices to end-users by allowing incremental
improvements to devices without the added expense of the PMA
process. These benefits are all available, so long as the new device
can be traced to a pre-1976 device for which the FDA has not
required a PMA.
But there are few shortcuts for competitors wishing to enter
23
the market for a Class III device introduced after 1976.
Competitors typically may enter the market only after successfully
completing the rigorous, time-consuming, and expensive PMA
process. The PMA process often creates a barrier to entry that
allows the approved manufacturer to reap monopoly profits, much
like the holder of a patent.
Accordingly, innovation and
competition may be stifled when it comes to devices subject to the
PMA process—specifically, those class III devices introduced after
1976.
A similar problem was addressed for pharmaceuticals in 1984
24
with the Hatch-Waxman Act. Hatch-Waxman created a bargain of
sorts. It created the abbreviated new drug application (ANDA)
process that focuses on similarity to an already approved “pioneer”
25
drug. It also created an exclusive period following the approval of
26
a new drug during which an ANDA cannot be approved. This
exclusive period serves to reward the manufacturer for bearing the
heavy burden of research and development and the new drug
regulatory process.
But after that exclusive period expires,
competitors (i.e., generic drug manufacturers) may enter the
market through the ANDA process without going through the time
27
and expense of a new drug application. This has created a robust
23. There are two potential shortcuts. First, a manufacturer may petition the
FDA to down-classify the device. Id. § 360c(f)(2)–(3). Second, a manufacturer
may reference information (e.g., clinical trial data) in a PMA that was approved
more than six years earlier. Id. § 360j(h)(4).
24. Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended in 21
U.S.C. § 355(j)).
25. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A).
26. Id. § 355(j)(2)(F). The period of exclusivity for a pioneer drug is based
on how different it is from previously approved drugs. For example, a pioneer
drug with an entirely new active ingredient will get five years of exclusivity, while
one with a new use of a known ingredient will get fewer. Id.
27. Id. § 355(j)(1), (j)(2)(A)(vii).
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and competitive generic-drug market. It may be appropriate to
enact a similar scheme for medical devices, which would make
more sense than using an almost forty-year-old date to determine
which regulatory process a device is subject to.
Although this aspect of medical-device law is stuck in the past,
many other aspects are rapidly changing and continuing to
develop. The articles in this Symposium Issue explore those
changing areas of medical-device law.
Three of the articles in this symposium, in part, explore the
28
impact of the MDA’s preemption section on state tort law. The
Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.
definitively interpreted that section, holding that state tort law is,
for the most part, preempted for those devices—often the highest
29
risk devices—that were approved through the PMA process. Since
Riegel, plaintiffs have been forced to explore alternative theories by
which to seek compensation for injuries caused by a PMA-approved
medical device.
In his article, Professor J. David Prince explores one route to
30
avoid Riegel-preemption: pleading a parallel claim.
A parallel
claim is one in which the state requirement is the same as the
federal requirement (i.e., it is not “different from, or in addition
31
to” a federal requirement). Such claims are not expressly
preempted by the MDA. His article explores recent decisions
regarding parallel claims and articulates a test for recognizing a
parallel claim. A parallel claim, however, may be impliedly
preempted under the standard articulated in Buckman v. Plaintiffs’
Legal Committee, in which the Court held that there was no private
32
right of action under the FDCA. Professor Prince also surveys the
cases that have attempted to toe the line between Buckman and
Riegel. And he discusses the pleadings challenges plaintiffs face
when asserting a parallel claim given the lack of information
available pre-discovery. He concludes that “[t]he precise contours
of the narrow gap through which a plaintiff bringing a product
28. Id. § 360k(a) (“[N]o State . . . may establish or continue in effect with
respect to a device intended for human use any requirement . . . which is different
from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable under [the MDA] to the
device, and which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device.”).
29. See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008).
30. J. David Prince, The Puzzle of Parallel Claims, Preemption, and Pleading the
Particulars, 39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1034 (2013).
31. 21 U.S.C § 360k(a).
32. 531 U.S. 341, 349 n.4 (2001).
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defect claim against a medical device manufacturer must sail in
33
order to avoid having her claims preempted are not yet clear.”
In their article, practicing attorneys Christiana C. Jacxsens,
Sara E. Deskins, and Sean P. Jessee discuss another tactic that
plaintiffs have employed to get around Riegel: “Since the Riegel
decision, plaintiffs have attempted to assert novel claims to avoid
preemption by focusing on the alleged conduct of sales
34
representatives.” Drawing on a wealth of practical experience, the
trio explores the multitude of “avenues for sales representative
35
liability” and the potential defenses that are available to such
claims. The authors also discuss the recent increase in government
enforcement actions against sales personnel and civil products
liability actions based on that government enforcement action.
Practicing attorneys David T. Schultz and D. Scott Aberson
discuss a third technique plaintiffs have attempted to use to avoid
Riegel-preemption—arguing that the FDA “limited its premarket
approval to only certain aspects or components of a particular
36
medical device or system.” As their article explains, this (perhaps
clever) argument, ultimately fails. They discuss a number of cases
involving PMA-approved devices that incorporate components that
had previously been brought to market through the 510(k)
process. In these cases, the plaintiffs argued that the PMA and
Riegel-preemption only applied to the components of the devices
that had not previously been marketed using the 510(k) process.
Sometimes, the plaintiffs even asked the FDA to clarify and narrow
the approval letter. In all cases, these petitions and these
arguments have been rejected. Accordingly, the authors conclude
37
“there is simply no such thing as a limited PMA.”
Patent attorneys Suneel Arora, Timothy J. Christman, Ashley
N. Mays, and Andrew Schmidt contribute an article about the
38
intersection of patent law and the 510(k) process.
They first
33. Prince, supra note 30, at 1084.
34. Christiana C. Jacxsens, Sara E. Deskins & Sean P. Jessee, Beyond the Basics:
Expanding Theories of Liability and Defenses for Claims Involving Medical Device Sales
Representatives, 39 WM. MITCHELL L.REV. 1087, 1089–90 (2013).
35. Id. at 1088.
36. David T. Schultz & D. Scott Aberson, Be Careful What You Ask For: The
FDA’s Denials of Citizen Petitions Confirms There Is No Such Thing as a Limited Premarket
Approval, 39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1157, 1158 (2013).
37. Id. at 1159.
38. Suneel Arora, Timothy J. Christman, Ashley N. Mays, PhD & Andrew
Schmidt, The Interplay Between FDA and Patent Law: Infusing Organizational Knowledge
for Medical Device Companies, 39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1176 (2013)
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discuss the tension between patent law and the 510(k) process. On
the one hand, while seeking to introduce a new medical device via
the 510(k) process, a manufacturer will assert that the device is
substantially equivalent to a preexisting device. But on the other
hand, while seeking a patent on that same device, the
manufacturer will claim that the same device is novel and nonobvious. Additionally, the authors discuss the impact of an
assertion of substantial equivalence in a 510(k) notification on a
defendant in a patent infringement lawsuit brought by the
manufacturer of the predicate device. The article provides
practical advice on how to coordinate regulatory and patent
submissions to address these challenges and emphasizes the
importance of “[i]nfusing knowledge of the interplay between the
39
patent and FDA processes.”
Dr. Bruce Patsner, a medical doctor and professor of law,
surveys the landscape of direct-to-consumer-advertising (DTCA) of
40
medical devices. He contrasts the DTCA of medical devices with
the DTCA of pharmaceuticals. In both cases, the FDA has
developed extensive regulations relating to the DTCA by
manufacturers. In the pharmaceutical world, these regulations
have been the subject of multiple First Amendment–based
challenges. Dr. Patsner explains that, unlike pharmaceutical
manufacturers, medical device manufacturers rarely engage in
DTCA. Rather, it is hospitals and physicians that advertise medical
devices to consumers. He then evaluates these advertisements,
finding that they often fall short of the regulations that would apply
if the advertisements were from the manufacturer. In some cases
he finds that the advertisements are even false or misleading. He
concludes that in the context of medical device DTCA, “prevention
of consumer fraud, not protection of the First Amendment rights
of corporations against government encroachment, is where the
41
battle line should be drawn.”
This Symposium Issue concludes with two dueling perspectives
on deactivating implanted cardiac-assist devices. First, Professor
Lars Noah introduces the thorny issue of where the line is between
a patient’s right to refuse medical treatment and physician-assisted
39. Id. at 1206.
40. Bruce Patsner, Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Restricted, Surgically
Implanted Medical Devices: What Does the Advertising Arena Look Like, and Whose
Regulatory Problem Is It?, 39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1207 (2013).
41. Id. at 1215.
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suicide in the context of deactivating implanted cardiac-assist
42
devices. He first discusses the growing use of implantable cardiacassist devices among the elderly and the potentially painful and
traumatic end-of-life issues associated with these devices. He then
surveys the perspectives in the medical-ethics literature on this
issue, and determines that medical ethics may inform, but does not
answer the legal question. He then looks for analogies in cases
relating to withdrawal of treatment and physician-assisted suicide.
Noting that medical devices straddle the lines between treatment,
property, and self, he concludes that these cases fail to provide an
adequate analogy for the deactivation of cardiac-assist devices and
that, in order to eliminate the associated uncertainty, states should
address this issue legislatively.
In response, David Orentlicher, a medical doctor and
professor of law, argues that in most cases a medical device is a
form of treatment and that a patient has an unconditional right to
43
refuse it or request its withdrawal.
Prof. Orentlicher then
describes a framework for evaluating the deactivation of implanted
cardiac devices to distinguish between permissible withdrawal of
treatment and euthanasia. He concludes that only if a medical
device were a complete and perfect replacement for an organ
would it be impermissible euthanasia to disable the device. Clearly,
this debate will not be settled for some time. But these two articles
provide new perspectives that are sure to influence it.

42. Lars Noah, Turn the Beat Around?: Deactivating Implanted Cardiac-Assist
Devices, 39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1229 (2013).
43. David Orentlicher, Deactivating Implanted Cardiac Devices: Euthanasia or the
Withdrawal of Treatment?, WM. MITCHELL. L. REV. 1287 (2013).
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